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Louisiana. A rather impractical Louisiana rule of evidence was
further limited in Lacaze v. Morway.' The case involved an auto-
mobile collision about which the accounts of the respective parties
differed widely. The plaintiff testified that he was driving at less
than 30 m.p.h. when the defendant impulsively dashed out of a
driveway into his path, the latter being drunk. The defendant
insisted that he was driving across an intersection when the plain-
tiff came roaring down the street at 50 m.p.h, and that he had
drunk nothing all evening except one beer an hour before.
At the trial it became apparent that there was only one disin-
terested witness to the accident, a passenger in the plaintiff's auto-
mobile who was not produced or even identified. The defendant
invoked the Louisiana doctrine that the unexplained failure of a
litigant to produce a material witness is presumptive evidence
that the witness would have given unfavorable testimony.' A ver-
dict for the defendant was returned on this presumption.
The court of appeals reversed the decision with something akin
to a judicial blush; it had turned out that the missing witness was
a married woman "who for obvious reasons did not want to get
involved." It is hoped that this case has ridiculed the unrealistic
presumption into the limbo of other discarded artificial evidence.
ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
Oklahoma. In Noble v. City of Bethany8 the trial court excluded
from evidence two letters which were offered by the plaintiff
under the Oklahoma Official Records Act.' The suit arose out of
1 57 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1952).
2 Reid v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 3 La. App. 608 (1925).
8 -.- Okla.., 241 P. 2d 401 (1952).
4 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Penn. ed.) § 486.
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the pollution of plaintiff's lake by the new Bethany sewage treat-
ment plant. Some time previously, the Chief Chemist of the State
Department of Health had corresponded with the Chief Engineer
of the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering, who in turn had written
the Mayor of Bethany, stating that the sewage disposal facilities
of the City were inadequate and likely to cause pollution and
subsequent litigation.
The majority of the supreme court decided that the letters were
properly excluded. It was pointed out that the statute applied only
to "papers authorized or required by law to be filed or recorded
in any public office." The letters were held analogous to a police.
man's report based on hearsay' and to the Insurance Commis-
sioner's certificate as to the contents of a policy,' both of which
documents had previously been held inadmissible under the
statute.
While it must be conceded that the court applied a correct
literal interpretation of the statute, the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Gibson would seem to offer a more realistic view.' He pointed
out that the Board of Health was required by law to investigate
and dispose of water pollution problems' and that the letters in
this case, although couched in polite language,9 still amounted to
an order that the pollution cease. Reports of water analysis made
by the Department of Health under this statute were unquestion-
ably admissible in evidence." If the orders of the Board are kept
out of court because of issuance as informal letters, private liti-
5 Hadley v. Ross, 195 Okla. 89, 154 P. 2d 939 (1944).
6 Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Meador, 186 Okla. 397, 98 P. 2d 20 (1939).
7 241 P. 2d at 405.
8,... [Tihe State Board of Health shall have the authority to make an order requir-
ing such pollution to cease within a reasonable time, or requiring such manner of treat-
ment or of disposition of the sewage or other polluting material as may in its judg-
ment be necessary to prevent the further pollution of such stream, or both." 63 OKLA.
STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) § 614.
9 "Before this project is officially submitted to this office for approval as required
by law, I think it is only right that the city officials be informed of the position the
Health Department will have to take...." 241 P. 2d at 403.
10 Town of Sentinel v. Riley, 171 Okla. 533, 43 P. 2d 742 (1935).
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gants are deprived of the use of facts discovered in public investi-
gation by public officials.
MEDICAL CASE HISTORY RECORDS - ADMISSIONS
IN ACCIDENT CLAIMS
Texas. The first Texas decision involving the scope of Section 2
of the new Official Records Act" is Smith v. Riviere.2 The action
was brought on behalf of an insane person to set aside his deed
executed some three years prior to the lunacy proceedings, while
he was in the naval service.
The first two hearings in the civil appeals court were directed
to the question of the admissibility of the jury's finding in the
prior lunacy proceedings that Riviere had been insane for three
years. The court held that admission of the verdict was subject
to objection, only the decretal part of the judgment being admis-
sible in this action.
On the second rehearing, error was assigned to the admission of
three Navy medical reports on Riviere's condition, including a
case history of his mental illness from childhood. The reports
were introduced as certified copies under federal 3 and state 4
statutes. The court here held that regardless of the sweeping
language of the statutes, they were not intended to permit the
introduction of evidence which would be otherwise objectionable:
Neither statute expresses or implies an intent to abrogate the well-
settled principle of the common law of the inadmissibility of hearsay
evidence based on further hearsay evidence .... 15
The result in this case is unquestionably the more sound con-
11 TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1952 Supp.) art. 3731a.
12 248 S. W. 2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
13 28 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 1733(a) : "Books or records of account or minutes of pro.
ceedings of any department or agency of the United States shall be admissible to prove
the act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of which the same were made or
kept."
14 Cited note 11 supra. The applicable part of § 2 admits into evidence "[a]ny
written statement, certificate, record, return or report made by an officer of the United
States ... or of any governmental subdivision of the foregoing ..
15 248 S. W. 2d at 530.
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struction of the statute. A report from the files of the Federal Gov-
ernment has an authentic ring to it, and a jury would be likely to
overlook its character as secondary hearsay (if such be the case).
It is doubtful whether the legislature intended the statute to be
other than a procedural simplification for proving the content of
public records. 6
A question of the admissibility of a claim made to the Indus-
trial Accident Board according to law 7 was raised in Texas
General Indemnity Co. v. Scott.'" Plaintiff was injured while at
work and filed a notice and claim stating that she had suffered
permanent injury and damage to her left foot and general nervous
system. In this suit, however, she asked damages for a permanent
neck injury as well; the defendant insurance company unsuccess-
fully sought to introduce the claim as an admission. The court of
civil appeals conceded that a party's silence, under circumstances
where it would be natural and usual for him to speak, may be
proved against him as an admission;19 but it held that claims
before the Industrial Accident Board were admissible solely for
jurisdictional purposes" and that in any event the exclusion would
be harmless error.
The supreme court, in reversing this holding, established the
rule that notice of injury and claim for compensation filed with
the Board was not privileged matter, but may be offered in evi-
dence as an admission. The court pointed out, of course, that, like
admissions received in evidence in other types of cases, such state-
ments or omissions are but evidence and as such are subject to
explanations or contradiction.2'
E. E. Marlatt.
16 See Ray, Three New Rules of Evidence, 5 Soutbw. L. J. 381, 386 (1951).
17 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 4a.
Is .---- Tex ........ 253 S. W. 2d 651 (1952), rev'g 246 S. W. 2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
19 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 387.
20 Uselton v. Southern Underwriters, 131 S. W. 2d 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
er. dism. judg. cor.
21 Cf. MCCORMICK AND RAY, supra note 19, § 495.
